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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to assess critically 
the development of United States tactical nuclear 
weapons (TNW) doctrine, from its inception during the 
Eisenhov/er years to its current status in the Carter 
Administration.
By viewing the evolution of tactical nuclear 
doctrine over the span of some thirty plus years, 
it was hoped that a better understanding of how 
American policy makers have related nuclear power to 
diplomacy could be achieved.
It is suggested that U.S. TNW doctrine has 
developed within the framework of deterrence in American 
strategic thought, The development of the doctrine has 
been primarily defensive in nature, measured to enhance 
the deterrent effect of U.S. theatre forces against 
Soviet inspired aggression.
Tactical nuclear doctrine as having deterrent value 
only is viewed as dangerously de-stabilising for United 
States nuclear weapons strategy, because an examination 
of Soviet literature and TNW capability indicates a 
tactical nuclear doctrine of first-use in theatre 
conflict. The disparity in US-USSR TNW doctrines results 
in an imbalance of force in Russo-American theatre 
scenarios. In conclusion, the recognition of tactical 
nuclear weapons as contemporary weapons of war and the 
integration of their use in U.S. military tactics and 
strategy are recommended.
\ v
UNITED STATES TACTICAL NUCLEAR 
DOCTRINE: DEVELOPING A CAPABILITY
Perhaps the basic problem of strategy 
in the nuclear age is how to establish 
a relationship between a policy of 
deterrence and a strategy for fighting 
a war in case deterrence fails.1
For more than thirty years, since the bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American strategists have 
struggled with the problem of military flexibility 
within the context of the ultimate deterrent; thermo­
nuclear war. Policy makers have attempted to develop 
a formula which would utilize the power of nuclear wea 
pons in the art of diplomacy, hoping that some secret 
combination of atomic capability, national will, and 
circumstance would provide enhanced leverage in inter­
national politics. As history records, however, those 
efforts have failed. Instead of expediting foreign 
policy on behalf of those nations with atomic capabili 
nuclear weapons have complicated their foreign policie 
Conflicts which arise between nuclear powers can not
i
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957)* P« 132.
have merely localized repercussions; the denouement 
of nuclear exchange would be disastrous for the world. - 
Furthermore, the nature of war itself has been 
transformed. The notion of winning seems obsolete 
when measured against the losses which would be incurred 
in a nuclear exchange. Indeed, the advent of nuclear 
weapons has, if anything, presented statesmen not with 
options of flexibility in the execution of national 
goals, but with the inflexibilities inherent in 
contemplating the unacceptability of nuclear war.
The history of the United States* strategic 
nuclear doctrine has been one of searching fcr an 
effective relationship between nuclear weapons and 
foreign policy, particularly with regard to its post- 
World War II adversary and nuclear counterpart, the 
Soviet Union. Since 19^9» when the Soviets detonated 
their first atomic warhead, the Soviet Union has been 
perceived by American strategists as the most significant 
threat to the United States in the tv/entieth century. 
Consequently, policy makers have been concerned with 
the task of deterring a costly nuclear exchange between 
the two ideologically different powers. Furthermore, 
given the rise of the Soviet Union as a pre-eminent
world power competing with the United States, an 
additional task has been to discover more effective 
applications of U.S. power and diplomacy in areas 
vital to American interests which are either directly 
or indirectly challenged by Soviet power.
This essay will address itself to the relation­
ship between nuclear power and American foreign policy. 
Specifically, it will deal with the doctrine of Tactical 
Nuclear Warfare (TNW) which has emerged from many years 
of policy debate on how nuclear weapons can best be 
utilized*in deterring Soviet aggression in certain 
strategic theatres. (The European theatre will provide 
most examples for this study, as it is often regarded 
as the most likely site for Soviet-American conflict.) 
Beyond deterrence, TNW has been suggested as a strategy 
for acquiring greater military and political leverage 
for the realization of American goals. Tactical Nuclear 
Warfare is by no means a recent option for U.S. policy 
makers. President Eisenhower suggested in 195^ that 
"our defense will be stronger if. . .we share with 
our allies certain knowledge of the tactical use of 
our nuclear weapons." And an examination of the doctrine
2
From the State of the Union address by President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, delivered before a joint session 
of Congress, 7 January 195^ (House of Representatives 
Document no. 251) 83d Congress, 2d Session, 195^* P«
from the Eisenhower years to the Administration of 
President James E. Carter will show that it has 
developed and matured as a tactic in the field of 
military strategy.
Such an examination, however, will also disclose 
that TNW has not "been taken seriously as a military 
strategy by any administration. At best, it has 
developed within the framework of deterrence. American 
tactical nuclear forces (TNF) have never been considered 
by the United States in terms of being part of a 
military strategy. And they are currently not regarded 
as offensive weapons. Rather, they are developed and 
deployed by the United States with the sole consideration 
of maintaining a balance of American and Russian 
theatre nuclear power. The calculus of deterrence is 
essentially one of numbers. How many warheads? How 
much throw-weight? How much power and accuracy? Present 
policy suggests that there is little need to consider 
the offensive use of nuclear weapons. If deterrence 
should fail, conventional forces will provide the first 
resort. TNW is viewed only as a final act of desperation.
This essay will explore the hypothesis that until 
Tactical Nuclear Warfare is incorporated into a military 
strategy of first-use, tactical nuclear forces will
6serve neither the purpose of theatre deterrence nor 
of strengthening the relationship between power and 
diplomacy. A corollary to this hypothesis is that 
there is a distinction between deterrence and military 
strategy, and that this distinction has yet to be 
made in considerations of Tactical Nuclear Warfare by 
U.S. strategists and policy makers alike.
I I
The first clear expression of a United States 
nuclear doctrine came in the Eisenhower years, and 
was aptly labeled Massive Retaliation. It was pre­
dicated on the assumption that if one could make the 
cost of enemy aggression intolerable, such aggression 
would be deterred. The Eisenhower Administration promulgated 
a doctrine of immediate U.S. response with nuclear 
capability if an opponent (namely the Soviet Union) 
should attempt armed aggression in areas that the United 
States perceived as vital to its interests. The response 
would be in the form of a disarming first-strike directed 
at targets in the Soviet Union, no matter how distant 
from the act of aggression. Massive Retaliation aimed 
at crippling the Soviet Union-- politically, economically, 
and militarily.
The emergence of Massive Retaliation was a result 
of basically three factors. First, it was a reaction 
against the recent Korean experience.*^ Americans were
3
-'See Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, ’’Deterrence 
in History," in John E. Endicott and Roy Stafford, eds., 
American Defense Policy, 4th edition (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977)•
7
unaccustomed to the travails and ambiguities of
limited war, and a reliance on a nuclear deterrent
seemed preferable to the maintenance, and overseas
involvement, of a large conventional army for a prolonged
period of time. In fact, a reliance on nuclear weaponry
was understandable, given the power vacuum created by
the unilateral disarmament of American conventional forces
during the eighteen months following the Korean -War.
"Ground, air, and naval units literally melted away
until it became virtually impossible to calculate what
military forces, if any, the United States could muster
in the face of a serious Soviet threat. Thus, the stage
was inevitably set for almost totaJL dependence by the
United States on the deterrent threat of the atomic
bomb to offset the massive superiority of Soviet ground 
A
forces. . . . "  The atomic bomb became the perfect 
replacement for vanishing American ground forces in 
maintaining a balance of power in post-War Europe.
Second, there was the consideration of cost- 
effectiveness . The Eisenhower Administration was committed
kHarland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity:
The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961- 
1971 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc.,
1973)* p. 5.
to reducing taxes and balancing the federal budget.
These domestic goals were not possible if the United
States maintained a comprehensive conventional military
posture. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
best summed up this point when he stated that America
needed allies and security, but by more effective and
less costly means than the large-scale commitment of
American troops. "This can be done by placing more
reliance on deterrent power and less dependence on
local defensive power."-* As another observer of the time
put it, "the essence of the. . . policy is that it is
actually possible for the United States to have greater
security at less cost, with fewer soldiers, and
6curtailed commitments abroad." The doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation was a welcome relief to the American people 
in so far as it would preclude the debilitating 
economic drain of a large standing army.
Finally, Massive Retaliation can be seen as a 
product of several occurrences internationally which
-*From "Evolution of Foreign Policy," address by 
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, delivered 
before the Council on Foreign Relations, 12 January 195^» 
United States Department of State Bulletin 30:107
(25 January 195^)s 108.
^Neal Stanford, "Two Looks at the New Look," in 
Herbert L. Marx, Jr., ed., Defense and National Security 
(New Yorks The H.W. Wilson Company^ 1955)i P« ^8*
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encouraged the perception by policy makers that 
world events were following an unacceptable course.
The Berlin Crisis of 19^8-19^9> the proliferation 
of Communist regimes in Europe, the Communist rev­
olution in China, and the Soviet A-Bomb test detonation
years ahead of U.S. expectations caused great alarm
7within American policy making circles. There.was a 
desire to convert America'a nuclear weapons into an 
effective leverage for the implementation of policies, 
the most important being the preservation of the status 
quo in the non-Communist world. The deterrence of 
Communist threats to South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast 
Asia, and Western Europe loomed large in the logic 
of Massive Retaliation.
There were problems, however, with a doctrine 
that necessitated a massive delivery of nuclear weapons 
upon provocation. What type of provocation would be 
deemed serious enough to precipitate nuclear war?
Indeed, exactly what acts of aggression would be de­
terred by the threat of nuclear exchange? Could a nuclear 
exchange be justified politically by an aggression
^See A.L. George and R. Smoke, "Deterrence in 
History," American Defense Policy for an examination 
of these factors.
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other than a direct attack upon the United States?
Henry Kissinger summarizes well this dilemma.
By identifying deterrence with maximum 
power. . . Massive Retaliation tends to 
paralyze the will. . . .  Given the power 
of modern weapons, a nation that relies on 
all-out war as its chief deterrent imposes 
a fearful psychological handicapp on itself,
The most agonizing decision a statesman 
can face is whether or not to unleash all-
out war; all the pressures will make for
hesitation, short of a direct attack threatening 
the national existence.8
Thus, the very credibility of Massive Retaliation 
was at once questionable, particularly after the 
Soviet Union began developing its own strategic 
force. Policy makers could not envisage bringing about 
a nuclear holocaust and certain self-destruction for the 
United States because of a theatre conflict far from 
its shores. Would New York and Chicago, for example, be 
exchanged for Berlin, or for some lesser provocation 
such as a minor border incursion in Korea or Finland?
Would the American people accept a nuclear exchange for
any cause other than their own survival? In short, the 
use of Massive Retaliation in anything other than a 
general Soviet-American war lacked credibility as a 
military strategy. It might well be argued that it
g
Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy, p. 133* -*
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lacked credibility as a deterrent as well, at least
in theatre scenarios in which the survival of the United
States was not at stake (e.g., a regional conflict in
Africa). As Henry Kissinger argues, "A deterrent which
one is afraid to implement when it is challenged ceases
9to be a deterrent.
Mot only would an enemy interpret Massive
Retaliation as a bluff, but the doctrine itself would
present American policy makers with few alternatives
between general nuclear war and acquiescence in piecemeal
aggression. As one author has put it, "reliance upon
massive retaliation not only stultfied the development
of new policy but encouraged a Maginot Line mentality--
dependence upon a strategy which may collapse or never
be used, but which meanwhile prevents the consideration
10 .of any alternative." Militarily, while perhaps 
deterring the Soviet Union from general war with the 
United States, Massive Retaliation left few alternatives 
to strategists for coping with theatre conflict, a 
localized outbreak of hostilities. Conventional strength 
and presence were expected to be at a minimum as, afterall,
^Ibid., p . 13^.
10Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity, 
pp. 36-37.
this was one reason for the existence of the doctrine,
but without a conventional posture in the "gray areas,"
the military would be impotent. However, if a
conventional posture were assumed, a significant purpose
of Massive Retaliation—  reliance on nuclear rather
than conventional capability—  would go for naught.
This was an uneasy paradox and few would now disagree
with Kissinger that "strategy can assist policy only by
developing a maximun number of stages between total peace
11(which may mean total surrender) and total war."
There were two basic needs, then, as U.S. strategic 
doctrine entered the 1960s. First, there was the continued 
need to deter a Soviet first-strike, which Massive 
Retaliation seemed to do. Second, there was a need 
for greater flexibility in deterring and, if necessary, 
countering Soviet inspired and/or supported theatre wars 
which might not warrant a general war jeopardizing the 
survival of the United States.
11Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Wenaons and Foreign 
Policy, p. 136.
Ill
While Massive Retaliation was based upon the
premise of completely obliterating the enemy in light
of "sufficient" provocation, the doctrine of Assured
Destruction was the result of the reassessment of
strategic doctrine within the context of increasing
Soviet nuclear capability. The essence of military
philosophy underlying Massive Retaliation, as mentioned
above, was to deter Soviet aggression by the threat of
a disarming and highly damaging strike with America'-a
nuclear force. The Kennedy Administration sought to
shift this philosophy by recognizing first, that a
disarming first-strike against the Soviet Union was no
longer possible and second, that the ability of both
nations to destroy each other would serve as a deterrent
to general war. One student has noted that this shift
was primarily motivated by our view of the 
arms race: we feared that our effort to main­
tain a capability for a disarming strike would 
stimulate a disarming buildup of Soviet forces; 
and conversely, we hoped that our restraint 
would be reciprocated.12
12Fred C. Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out 
the Century?" Foreign Affairs 51:2 (January 1973)** 270.
1^
Assured Destruction, then, had two basic func­
tions. One, "to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon
13the United States or its allies," J and two* to bring a 
semblance of stability to strategic doctrine and a 
nuclear arms race. The Kennedy Administration correctly 
recognized that there was nothing that the United States 
could have done (at least nothing short of a massive 
first-strike in the early 1950s when Soviet nuclear 
capability was low), or could now do to prevent the 
Soviet Union from acquiring a second-strike capability. 
Even a massive nuclear retaliation would not destroy the 
ability of the U.S.S.R. to launch an unacceptable attack 
upon the United States. The Soviet sense of insecurity 
with regard to the West would drive them on toward 
achieving some measure of parity. Assured Destruction 
was an attempt, therefore, to possess an effective 
deterrent by assuring the U.S. "the capability to destroy 
the aggressor as a viable society even after a surprise
1 2j,
attack." By calculating how much nuclear weaponry
13-'Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: 
Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1968), p. 52.
14Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before 
the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 
89th Congress, 1st Session, 24 FebruSwry 1965* Hearings 
on Military Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966, p. 43.
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would be required to destroy an arbitrary percentage 
of the Soviet population, industry, and military 
capability, Assured Destruction sought to create a 
stable deterrent to general war between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. If, for example, 1000 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) were required 
to destroy a third of the Soviet population and two- 
thirds of Soviet industrial and military capability, 
then there would be no need for U.S. deployment of 
nuclear weaponry beyond that level. It was hoped that 
this calculated approach to deterrence would be duplicated 
by Soviet strategists, thus curbing an arms race.
As a deterrent, Assured Destruction was little 
different from Massive Retaliation. Both doctrines were 
predicated on the assumption that if an unacceptable 
amount of damage could be inflicted upon the Soviet Union 
so as to make the costs of general war exceed the benefits, 
then general war would be deterred. And, as a general 
deterrent, Assured Destruction was subject to the same 
criticisms which plagued Massive Retaliation, namely 
the lack of options short of surrender and nuclear 
holocaust which policy makers could consider in a crisis
17
situation. Van Cleave and Barnett note that Assured
Destruction was "necessary—  hut insufficient." Its
problem was a "lack of sufficient options between no
15response and large-scale responses." ^ But it was 
different from Massive Retaliation in so far as 
designating how iiuch was necessary for deterrence. And 
perhaps more importantly, it differed in its assessment 
of what exactly it could deter.
There were no pretensions within the Kennedy 
Administration that strategic nuclear weapons could be 
used in .any other way except to deter general war 
with the Soviet Union. This line of thought, ipso facto, 
necessitated greater emphasis on the fighting of lesser 
wars than those of an all-out exchange, and this emphasis 
was reflected in the efforts of Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara to procure a more effective conventional 
posture for the United States. Believing that the Soviets 
had set a determined course of exacerbating third-world
i < .
-'William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett, 
"Strategic Adaptability," in Robert J. Pranger and 
Roger P. Labrie, Nuclear Strategy and National Security: 
Points of View (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise 
Institute for Policy Research, 1977)» PP» 214-17.
18
1 fi
conflicts into theatre wars, McNamara stressed the 
need for an "adequate level of non-nuclear military 
strength. . , to meet a limited challenge with limited 
f o r c e s . T h u s  the concept of limited war became 
prominent in the Kennedy Administration, But the 
military response in a limited conflict was to he con­
ventional, not nuclear. A build-up of non-nuclear forces 
was seen as the key to increasing the American capacity 
to "tailor. . . responses to a particular military 
challenge to that level of force which is both appropriate
to the issue involved and militarily favorable to our 
1 R
•' side." There was little room for the consideration 
of tactical nuclear force. As McNamara would say, the 
United States "could not substitute tactical nuclear 
weapons for conventional forces in the types of conflict
16It was widely believed by many at that time 
that Soviet strategy concentrated on third-world "hot 
spots." Soviet Chairman Khrushchev contributed to this 
belief by outlining Soviet aims as precluding both 
general war and direct theatre conflict with the United 
States for the reason of probable escalation to thermo­
nuclear war. He stressed, however, that liberation wars 
in third-world countries were inevitable as long as 
imperialism existed. For many American policy makers, 
this was an ominous note.
171 Robert S. McNamara, from a speech given before 
the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, 17 
February 1962, in Vital Speeches 28:10 (March 1962): 297*
18Ibid.. p. 2$8 .
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that were most likely to involve" the United States
"in the period of the 1960s, (Localized third-
world conflict).
Even though the Kennedy Administration accepted
that "an effective tactical nuclear capability was
20essential to overall strategy," little serious 
attention was given to the development and implementation 
of a tactical nuclear doctrine. The consensus among 
policy makers at the time was that, as Khrushchev stated, 
Tactical Nuclear Warfare was simply the first step toward 
holocaust. Escalation to strategic weaponry seemed 
inevitable after a first use. Furthermore, it was felt 
that it would only be a matter of time before the 
Soviets duplicated the American effort at developing 
a tactical nuclear force, thus leading to a similar 
stalemate of power that followed the buildup of Soviet 
strategic forces. This reasoning changed little through 
the Johnson years, as that Administration was involved 
in a problem more pressing and real than considerations 
of theoretical scenarios of TNF theatre conflict; Vietnam. 
Thus, TNW doctrine remained as it was in the Kennedy 
years, until the coming of the Nixon Administration, 
ig
^Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security, p. 69. 
20Ibid.
IV
In a hearing before the Armed Services Committee
on the FY 1973 defense budget, Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird stated that the United States planned
to relate its "nuclear weapons posture in the theatre
to its conventional posture" so as to create options
short of sole reliance on strategic nuclear weapons
21should a crisis arise. This would, 111 Laird's words,
allow "maximum flexibility of response. . . should
22deterrence fail."
Indeed, the defense posture presented to the 
country by the Nixon Administration was in stark 
contrast to those of previous administrations. The 
"Nixon Doctrine" called for a retreat of American forces 
from around the world, emphasising a reliance on increasing 
allied responsibility instead. Furthermore, it recog­
nized the status of the Soviet Union as a comparable 
nuclear power, asking only a strategic sufficiency on
21Melvin R. Laird, cited in Endicott and Stafford, 
eds„, American Defense Policy, p. 81.
22Ibid.
20
21
23the part of the United States, ^ and it incorporated 
the doctrine of Tactical Nuclear Warfare into its 
calculations of military and political flexibility.
The latter is the concern of this essay. Why did TNW 
achieve higher status in the Nixon Administration than 
in the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, or 
Johnson? Why was 1972 so different from previous years 
in terms of nuclear strategy? What had happened to 
facilitate a more welcome response from strategists and 
policy makers to TNW?
Perhaps the basic cause of the shift toward 
Tactical Nuclear Warfare as a doctrine for theatre 
conflict was the rise of Soviet capability. With the 
United States heavily involved in Vietnam for the better 
part of a decade, the Soviet Union capitalized on the 
on the opportunity to make marked improvements in its 
strategic posture (see Figure A). The leveling off of 
U.S. ICBM and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) 
deployments illustrates the earlier doctrine of Assured
23^Strategic sufficiency was predicated upon 
fulfilling the following the following criteria:
(1) Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability 
to deter an all-out surprise attack on U.S. strategic 
forces; (2) providing no incentive for the Soviet 
Union to strike the United States first in a crisis;
(3 ) preventing a grave imbalance in strategic forces; 
and (4) defending against damage from small attacks 
or accidental launches.
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Destruction as well as Nixon's doctrine of strategic 
sufficiency. Deployment of strategic weaponry was to 
he only at that level which guaranteed the destruction 
of a viable Soviet society, i.e., an arbitrary percentage 
of population and military-industrial capacity. As can 
be seen in the chart, there was even a substantial 
reduction of the U.S. bomber force, long the foundation of 
American deterrence. But Soviet deployment of both 
conventional and nuclear weapons continued to increase 
until the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) 
Agreement of May, 1972 which established deployment 
ceilings for ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.
Be that as' it may, after involvement in Vietnam 
came to an end, the United States found itself at a 
serious conventional disadvantage in the European 
theatre. In addition to growing Soviet strategic and 
conventional capability, it also found itself confronted 
by ever growing Soviet tactical nuclear forces.
Within this context, it is possible to explore TNW as 
a doctrine. What did it hope to accomplish? What was 
its purpose? And how was it received critically?
While Nixon and Laird introduced a more developed 
concept of TNW than had previous defense spokesmen, it 
was Secretary of Defense James L. Schlesinger who 
attempted to transform the concept into strategy, giving 
TNW specific definition. This involved, basically, a 
change in targeting doctrine, or exactly where missiles 
are to be sent, in what force, and under what circum­
stances. Whereas McNamara had addressed targeting doctrin
oh
early on in the Kennedy Administration, it was only 
as a part of Assured Destruction. McNamara's counter­
force strategy involved a more selective procedure in 
targeting strategic forces than Eisenhower's policy 
of massive and arbitrary strikes on Soviet sites. The
2h
See R. McNamara, from an address given at Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, 16 .June 1962, in Department of State 
Bulletin 47:1202 (9July 1962): 64-59.
purpose of counterforce strategy was to give body to 
nuclear military strategy in case a general war be­
came a reality. It was thought that nuclear targeting 
in an atomic exchange should be no different from 
strategic bombing in World War II where the object of 
targeting was less to intimidate the enemy by inflicting 
unacceptable losses than neutralization of its military- 
industrial capacity.
Schlesinger introduced a.new form of counter­
force strategy to allow the military greater flexibility 
in a nuclear exchange. It was the recognition that 
deterrence might fail and that conflict between the 
superpowers might ensue which led to this assessment.
If a war had to be fought perhaps it could be fought in 
a limited way. If there was available to the military 
flexibility in their response to aggression, then perhap 
the level of nuclear exchange could be regulated, short 
of massive retaliation.
What the change in targeting doctrine does 
is give the President of the United States 
the option of limiting strikes down to a 
few weapons. It would be understood that, if 
the United States were to strike the Soviet 
Union in response to some hypothetical act
25
on their part, this would not have to 
he a massive response'.25
The creation of more military options In a 
nuclear exchange could, in turn, create more political 
options. Certainly, the possibility of a limited nuclear 
response to Soviet theatre aggression v/ould be per­
ceived by the Soviets a,s more credible than an un­
inhibited nuclear exchange. Hence, "the effect of the
emphasis on selectivity and flexibility. . . would be
26to improve deterrence across the spectrum of risks."
Tactical Nuclear Warfare, then, appealed to
strategists for a variety of reasons. Since the possibility
of a nuclear war could not be denied, the President must
never be limited to a choice between acquiescence to
an aggressor, or exhausting America's nuclear arsenal
in an exchange. "Since there is a great uncertainty
about how a nuclear war might start, response should be
27available to deal with a wide range of possibilities." {
25
<James R. Schlesmger, in report to the Subcommittee 
on Arms Control, International Lav/ and Organizations of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, in U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
Strategic Policies, 93nd Congress, 2d Session, k March
1974. p. 106. ~
26Ibid.. p. 105.
27'Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New 
Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" Foreign Affairs 
(July 197*0 : 765 •
26
p Q
Tactical nuclear weapons of a low-yield nature, '
placed contiguously in strategically vital areas
29permit a maximum of counterforce capability. Low- 
yield weapons permit the targeting of military-industrial 
sites without an inordinate population kill. Hence, 
nuclear exchange could be kept almost entirely 
at a military-industrial level, and strategically 
contiguous weapons (Foward Based Systems) would increase 
the accuracy of TNF used. Thus, a combination of 
low-yield weapons and a - high degree of accuracy would 
contribute to a more controlled targeting and, it was 
hoped, a more controlled exchange. Needless to say, 
a more controlled exchange would enhance credibility 
and deterrence. (It would do well to note that this 
point had been made by some scholars in the late fifties 
and the sixties—  Brodie, Kissinger, Kahn, Wolfers—  
but policy is rarely a contemporary of theory.)
p Q
Low-yield nuclear weapons might be defined 
as those v/eapons with an explosive power of 30 kilo- 
tons (30 thousand tons equivalent TNT) which, upon 
detonation, produce effects which remain in the lower 
atmosphere and are thus entirely local.
29 - ■'Counterforce capability is defined as that
capability to destroy military industrial sites.
Countervalue capability involves only civilian targets,
i.e., cities.
Another concern expressed by proponents of
TNW was the fact that the Soviets were acquiring
greater depth in their tactical nuclear forces. If
the Soviet Union were to initiate tactical nuclear war,
would the United States be able to respond at a
level commensurate with Soviet use? That kind of capacity,
Schlesinger noted, would have to be accompanied by
appropriate training in Tactical Nuclear Warfare use
as well as the planning in anticipation of the difficultie 
30involved. Schlesinger further warned that it was not
a wise strategy to delay considerations of TNW until
pressed by circumstances.
Rather one should think through the prob­
lems in advance and put together relevant, 
small packages which a President could choose 
under the circumstances in which they might 
be required.3i
The failure to acquire a TNW capability which 
could adequately meet a Soviet first use would result 
in a serious military disadvantage in the field, and 
perhaps make unavoidable an escalation to the level of 
general war. For example, if Soviet forces utilized 
tactical nuclear weapons in a European theatre conflict,
30James Schlesinger, in Report to the Subcommittee 
on Arms Control, U.S.-U.-S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. '107*
31Ibid.
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selectively neutralizing military targets (communi­
cation, "bridges, supply railways, and TNF storage 
areas) while sparing civilian population by use of 
low-yield weaponry, could the United States respond 
in kind? If not, there would be several unpleasant 
options from which to choose. Beginning with the 
assumption that NATO's nuclear stockpiles have all 
but been destroyed by Soviet counterforce strategy, the 
options for NATO are to (1) acquiesce in Soviet gains; 
(2) continue to .fight a conventional war; (3 ) resort to 
the use of what TNF was left after Soviet counterforce 
strikes; and (k) launch strategic weapons in response, 
due to the lack of an effective TNF doctrine of use.
The first two options can be labeled as unequivocal 
defeat. The third seems, at best, weak, and would simply 
be a defensive response well after Soviet gains had 
been consolidated. The last Option can be seen as 
self-defeating and a return to the dilemma of Massive 
Retaliation. Nuclear suicide for the United States would 
simply not be a rational response for the loss of X 
amount of European territory. Without a capability for 
TNW, the first option (acquiescence) would seem the 
only reasonable alternative. The second would leave 
NATO forces at a gross disadvantage; the third would
29
be a late reaction, ineffective due to damage 
incurred by Soviet counterforce strategy; and the 
fourth would be suicidal.
Strategists for a TNW capability, therefore, 
argued the necessity for a doctrine of nuclear 
weapons use. Such a doctrine would supply U.S. and 
allied forces with TNW options from which political 
and military leaders could choose as the exigencies 
of conflict demand.
There were, however, several criticisms of 
selective targeting, tactical counterforce strategy, 
and TNW doctrine in general. Simply because Schlesinger, 
as Secretary of Defense, introduced a targeting doctrine 
which encouraged flexible response with nuclear weapons 
in a theatre conflict did not assure the broad im­
plementation of TNW as military doctrine. There were 
politicians at home and allies abroad who had to be 
convinced of the wisdom of TNW, and the problems involved 
could properly be regarded as substantial.
There was the fear that "as nuclear war becomes
12more manageable, it also becomes more likely."^ It is 
true that to use low-yield, strategically contiguous 
tactical nuclear weapons might make the exchange of
-^Greenwood and Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate," 
Foreign Affairs, p. ?66,
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such weaponry more manageable. Because a more definite 
control of weapons can be attained with TNF, strategic 
objectives can be better implemented. All of this, 
theoretically, makes a tactical exchange quite "safe" 
in the sense that there is a low probability of es­
calation to general war. The capacity to fight TNW 
seems a major plus in creating a myriad of options, 
both of a political and military nature. But might the 
mere presence of a great number of "safe" options 
encourage their use? Might a capability for TNW guarantee 
its place on the battlefield? Indeed, might the very fact 
that one power is developing a TNW capability force the 
other power to consider it more seriously as a military
doctrine? In short, "as the use of nuclear weapons be­
llcomes more thinkable, it also becomes more acceptable.
It is, after all, the uncertainty involved in calculations 
of any nuclear exchange which should provide a deterrent 
against their use. When the use of TNF becomes a military 
art of precision and an effective counterforce strategy, 
then predictability of nuclear exchange becomes a reality 
and the uncertainty involved in deterrence fades, thus 
making Tactical Nuclear Warfare more probable.
^^Ibid., p. ?66.
Another, more profound, criticism is that TNW 
as a military doctrine is not possible at all. It can 
only be the initial stage in an escalation toward 
general war. Consider the scenario: Theatre conflicts 
emerge in Europe and the Middle East. Warsaw Pact troops 
make a conventional push into the Federal Republic of 
Germany while Soviet surrogates precipitate armed con­
flict against Istael and interfere with petroleum 
deliveries both to Israel and the United States. The 
U.S. decides to respond with Tactical Nuclear Warfare 
in Europe-- low-yield, accurate counterforce strikes-- 
to alleviate military disadvantage for NATO forces and 
at the same time send a warning signal to hostile forces 
in the Middle East. It would be hoped that such a display 
of TNF would show the resolve on the part of the West to 
resist aggression, and the willingness to escalate if 
necessary. Theoretically, the possibility of escalation 
is enough of a deterrent to at least prevent further 
aggression and to perhaps stabilize the situation. But 
the question remains: Will the Soviet Union perceive 
correctly the intricacies of strategy involved in the 
U.S. response, or, rather, will they view it as the first 
stage in an attempted American effort to neutralize Soviet
32
power by strategic exchange? They will then respond, 
accordingly, by launching ICBMs? Thus there is the 
problem of distinguishing between TNW and general war.
The above scenario illustrates the problem of 
a mutual understanding with regard to the use of 
TNF. There may simply be none. For example, there is 
no agreement between the United States and the Soviet 
Union (or any other nuclear powers for that matter) as 
to what criteria exist for determining a proper target 
for tactical nuclear weapons. Or, indeed, there is no 
understanding as to what constitutes a tactical nuclear 
weapon. Is it a weapon with 20 kilotons of force? 50 
kilotons? 100 kilotons? Can it be launched from a 
location far removed from the theatre, a submarine for 
example? Should TNF be measured by range, power, or by 
effect? Even if there is agreement on exactly what a 
tactical nuclear weapon is, can the belligerents limit 
destruction with their use in a manner commensurate 
with the limited objectives of the conflict? If not,
'ih,
escalation is very probable*
The potential problems posed by TNW have led to 
an ambivalence on the part of policy makers in incorporating
J See Robert E. Osgood for an exposition on the 
problems associated with TNW, particularly the problem 
of mutual definition' between belligerents, in Limited 
War: The Challenge of American Strategy (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1957)*
its tenets into military strategy. For Americans, the 
use of TNF portends escalation and unimaginable destruction 
to the United States, and for what? Control of the 
Rhine or the Ruhr? NATO members in Europe are also 
understandably anxious about TNW doctrine, even more 
so than Americans. Any implementation of TNW will more 
than likely take place within their territory. And yet 
there is a realization among both Americans and their 
allies that, in Europe, Warsaw Fact forces greatly out­
number their NATO counterparts, and elsewhere Soviet 
military activity is at an unprecedented level of deploy­
ment. Not only is Soviet conventional power a challenge, 
but Soviet TNF is substantial, confronting the allies 
with the most unpleasant of possibilities should war 
occur. In addition to a general ambivalence toward TNW 
then, there is also the desire to have available the 
military flexibility and political options which possession 
of a doctrine of use would offer.
As Kissinger would say, "We thus return to the
basic problem of limited war in the nuclear age: where
to strike the balance between the desire for posing
the maximum threat and the need for a strategy which
35does not paralyze the will."-'*' The remainder of the thesis
35^ •'Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy, p. 191.
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will deal with current United States TNW doctrine 
as expressed by the Carter Administration- and will 
consider how well it confronts the problem of relating 
nuclear power to diplomacy and military strategy, par­
ticularly in theatre considerations. An examination of 
the strategy and tactics of tactical nuclear war will 
provide the conclusion.
VIn current TNW doctrine, as expressed by the 
Carter Administration, there is no deviation from the 
pattern of U.S. nuclear weapons policy historical 
development. First and foremost, there is the goal 
of deterring a Soviet first-strike against the United 
States. This is done by retaining "the capability at 
all times to inflict an unacceptable level of damage 
on the Soviet Union, including the destruction of a 
minimum of 200 major Soviet cities."-^ The current 
policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to deter 
a first-strike is consistent with earlier doctrines 
of Massive Retaliation and Assured Destruction in that 
it assumes that making the costs of a first-strike exceed 
its benefits will deter a rational adversary.
The mainstay of MAD is the concept of Essential 
Equivalence; that the United States possess a nuclear 
strike power roughly equal to that of the Soviet Union.
-^Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, cited in 
Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979 
(Washington, D.C.s Government Printing Office, 1978),
p. 55-
35
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This concept is not far removed from the sufficiency
doctrine posited by the Nixon Administration. According
to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Essential
Equivalence serves four major purposes. "It helps
to ensure that political perceptions are in accord
with the military realities. , . ; it minimizes the
probability that opposing strategic forces will be used
to seek any diplomatic advantage; it reduces the chance
that one side or the other will become vulnerable to
charges of a bomber or missile gap. . . . , thereby
contributing to strategic stability in a crisis by
reducing the incentives for either side to strike first
or pre-empt; and it provides a stable framework through
37which to effect arms reduction. Essential Equivalence 
is the guarantee that the United States will possess a 
second-strike capability-^ with regard to the Soviet 
Union, thus deterring general war. As Brown suggests, 
by requiring that the United States possess an essentially
•^Ibid., pp. 56-57•
-^A second-strike capability is that capability 
which permits a nation to absorb a nuclear attack and 
have sufficient nuclear weaponry left to respond with 
an attack of its own which will exact a comparable 
degree of destruction on the aggressor.
equivalent nuclear capability vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union, perceptions of strategic inequality which may 
encourage first-strike attempts are discouraged.
Under Carter, TNW doctrine remains basically 
the same as when expressed by Laird and Schlesinger.
TNF is maintained "to complement and provide a link 
between conventional and strategic nuclear forces."- 
That is, tactical nuclear weapons are envisaged as 
providing options between conventional defeat and 
nuclear holocaust. The United States "must not be 
committed to a single, inflexible war plan," Theatre 
nuclear weapons, in the Carter Administration, are thus 
given a role similar to the role given them by Nixon.
In a time of crisis a TNF capability will present alterna 
tives of flexibility to the decision maker. But, more 
importantly, TNF capability represents a more credible 
deterrent than strategic capability to Soviet theatre 
aggression. "TNFs are intended to deter theatre nuclear
hi
attacks in conjunction with conventional forces. . . ."' 
This observation introduces a very significant point 
in the development of TNW doctrine.
Brown, POD Annual Report, FY 19791 p. 130.
^ Ibid., p. 42.
kl
Ibid., p. 130. Also see Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance before the Royal Institute for International Affair 
London, in Secretary of State (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 
of Public Affairs, 1978) .
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In retrospect, the history of U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy reveals two lines of development.
The most consistent of these, from Eisenhower to 
Carter, has been the Massive Retaliation concept of 
deterrence. This has remained in one form or another 
and has differed from one administration to the next 
only in estimations of what it could accomplish.
Under Eisenhower, it was believed that Massive Re­
taliation could deter any act of aggression anywhere. 
Assured Destruction, it has been shown, still 
guaranteed the massive response of nuclear exchange, 
but only if confronted by the threat of a Soviet 
first-strike. It recognized the limits of massive 
buildups of nuclear stockpiles, as well as what a 
massive response doctrine could deter. Strategic 
Sufficiency and Essential Equivalence are both pre­
dicated upon the strategy of a massive U.S. nuclear 
response to a Soviet first-strike, albeit the targeting 
of such response had been refined to include greater 
counterforce capability. The 1970s have seen the 
inclusion of targeting flexibility in calculations of 
how massive a nuclear response should be. But the 
essential mission of U.S. strategic forces contined to 
be measured by its massive destructive capability.
A second line in nuclear weapons policy has 
been that of flexible response. Recognizing the failure 
of Massive Retaliation in deterring acts of aggression 
lesser in magnitude than a first-strike against the 
United States, policy makers moved toward creating a 
more credible response to non-nuclear aggression.
McNamara implemented programs which enhanced American 
conventional forces, and saw these forces as the answer 
to U.S. impotency in taking forceful action around the 
world short of nuclear exchange. However, as Soviet 
strategic and tactical capability grew during U.S. 
involvement in Southeast Asia, post-Vietnam administrations 
have seen the need to incorporate Tactical Nuclear 
Warfare in theatre scenarios. The significance of 
this move, however, lies not in the move itself, but 
in how TNW doctrine has been incorporated in U.S. 
nuclear weapons policy.
In The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World
1±2
Order. Bernard Brodie and Arnold Wolfers suggested 
that, whereas in the past, before nuclear weapons, the 
purpose of U.S. military doctrine had been to win wars,
Il o Bernard Brodie and Arnold Wolfers, eds., The 
Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New 
Y ork s Hare ourt, Brac e and C ompany, 19^6).
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in the future, it must be to avert them, to deter them. 
Indeed, the consistency involved in strategic thinking 
throughout U.S. post-War history well reflects this 
shift. As has been noted, Massive Retaliation, Assured 
Destruction, Strategic Sufficiency, and MAD all share 
the common theme of deterrence. Furthermore, the shift 
in strategic thought from winning wars to deterring 
them has involved all facets of warfare, including 
conventional and tactical nuclear forces.
When McNamara emphasized the shoring up of Am­
erica's conventional posture, it was for the purpose 
of meeting small-scale military threats which could not 
be met with strategic nuclear weapons, for example, 
guerrilla wars, East-West border skirmishes (perhaps 
Berlin), and possibly more, intense conventional conflicts. 
Tactical nuclear weapons were valued primarily with 
respect to their role as a deterrent in U.S. theatre 
strategy, supplementing the strategic nuclear
umbrella. How "an effective tactical nuclear capability
43was essential to . . • overall strategy" J was at best 
an ambiguous matter for the Kennedy Administration.
43-'Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security,
p. 69.
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In addressing the Senate Subcommittee on Arms
Control on the topic of targeting strategy and the role
of limited/tactical nuclear war, Secretary Schlesinger
stated that, to the extent they make "the possible use
of U.S. strategic forces more credible, (TNFs) have
44a beneficial effect on deterrence." Confronted by 
increasing Soviet tactical and conventional forces 
(particularly in Europe), the Nixon Administration was 
concerned about how to deter aggression which the Soviets 
might directly or indirectly encourage because of 
perceiving post-Vietnam America as restrained by domestic 
forces. The shift toward considering TNW more seriously 
is understandable given the context of a debilitated 
United States, its strength sapped by years of involvement 
in Southeast Asia. It was hoped that the possibility of 
TNW, if allied conventional forces were challenged by 
an adversary, would deter the challenge from proceeding 
beyond the initial stage. Furthermore, given the recent 
growth of Soviet TNF capability, the mere possession 
of tactical nuclear weapons was seen as the absolute 
minimum in the maintenance of deterrence. Harold Brown, 
for example, states that "U.S. theatre nuclear forces
44Schlesinger to Subcommittee on Arms Control, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies, p. 108.
have a symbolic importance that transcends their
kcC
direct military v a l u e . B r o w n  continues:
There is no evidence that nuclear firepower 
can substitute for the other elements of a 
conventional capability. . . . Nonetheless, 
the TNFs play a vital role in our overall ^  
posture of deterrence and collective security.
Tactical Nuclear Warfare, then, has been considered 
by successive administrations since Eisenhower, but 
within the framework of deterrence. Theoretically, the 
possible use of TNW in theatre conflict has been 
credited with providing more options to policy makers, 
options between the extremes of acquiescence and ex­
haustive nuclear exchange. But even the possiblity of 
use has been valued only as a deterrent, not as a 
first-use weapon of war. In a review of the relevant 
literature it is difficult to find assessments of the 
military value of TNW. Dominating any discussion of 
TNF use is the concept of deterrence. Glenn Snyder 
accurately notes that "deterrence in war is most sharply 
illustrated in proposals for a strategy of limited 
retaliation, in which initial strikes, in effect, would 
be threats of further strikes to come, threats designed
^Harold Brown, POD Annual Report, FY 1979, p. 68. 
Ibid..  p .  67 .
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to deter the enemy from further fighting,” ' Thus,
TNF has heen related to diplomacy and military strategy 
as a bargaining chip, an equalizer in the game of 
deterrence, and TNW doctrine is a card between the 
bluff of massive retaliation and the folding of U.S. 
forces during a crisis. It is a card which should force 
the opponent to pursue a cautious game because he knows 
that it can be played at any moment. Furthermore, it 
is a card which should deter a game-winning risk.
The question with which this study deals, however, 
is "Can the incorporation of TNW doctrine into strategic 
considerations as a deterrent force, rather than as a 
military weapon of first-use, actually be effective in 
deterring aggression?" That is, if the enemy assesses 
U.S. TNF capability as purely symbolic, as being en­
tirely for the purpose of deterrence calculations as 
opposed to actual use, then will the enemy be deterred?
The role of TNW as a deterrent force in U.S. military 
doctrine may prove to be counterproductive in that its 
value, measured only as an element in calculating 
deterrence could devalue its credibility as a useable 
tactic. The fact that TNW has not been seriously considere
Ln
'Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense: A 
Theoretical Introduction," in Endicott and Stafford, 
eds., American Defense Policy, p. 43.
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as a viable doctrine may actually encourage Soviet
"testing" of U.S. and NATO determination to preserve
48territorial integrity. Certainly the risks involved 
in "testing" are perceived as less if a major component 
of deterrence loses its value. Put more candidly, is 
the United States equipped with both the capability 
and the doctrine to fight successfully a tactical 
nuclear war? The most effective deterrent to Soviet 
aggression, or "testing", is bound to be an affirmative 
response with regard to both capability and doctrine.
48'"Testing" can be defined as the creation 
of scenarios in which the potential of conflict 
exists. For example, Soviet inspired trouble in 
Berlin, or, in a bolder move, a NATQ-Warsaw Pact 
border crisis.
V I
When asked about Soviet intentions in challenging
the United States on a variety of fronts, General
Alexander Haig, Jr., former Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, stated that intentions were vague, not
amenable to measurement; that capability was the
LiQsource of concern.Indeed, m  measurements of Soviet 
capability and doctrine of use there is substance to 
the belief that the U.S.S.R. is actively challenging 
the U.S.A. Conventionally, the U.S.S.R. possesses a 
clear advantage over the United States (see Figure B),
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See James Flowers, "General Alexander Haig, Jr.: 
Keeping NATO in Shape," The Saturday Evening Post 
(February 1979): 53.
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In terms of tanks, divisions of troops, artillery,
tactical aircraft, and surface/subsurface combatants,
the Soviet Union deploys almost twice what the U.S.
deploys. Also, by the most recent American intelligence
estimates, defense outlays, of the Soviet defense
establishment are clearly outstripping U.S. efforts
(see Figure C). The Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear
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capability is a respectable one, but so too is the
capability of the United States (see Figure D). If
a tactical nuclear war becomes a reality, numerical
capability will not be the issue. ^
What most certainly will weigh in the balance
of forces is the doctrine pertaining to the use of
TNF, Secretary Brown was cited earlier as emphasizing
the symbolic importance of U.S. tactical nuclear forces
to America's allies-- an importance which transcends
their military value because "there is no evidence that
nuclear firepower can substitute for the other elements
of a conventional capability."^ A question to ask
would be whether or not the Soviets share the U.S.
policy makers' perceptions of TNW capability as solely
or primarily of symbolic and deterrent value. The answer
62seems to be a resounding "No."^
60 . • •^ In his report to Congress, United States Military
Posture for FY 1979, General George Brown, former Chair­
man—  Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that "the current 
inventory of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons is becoming 
obsolete and requires modernization. Many weapons now 
available reflect technology of the 1950s and 1960s."
He concluded by saying, however, that "improvements are 
being made." p. 88. Of course, the analyst must consider 
the source, as Brown has a case to make for DOD's budget.
-^See Brown, POD Annual Report, FY 1979, p. 68.
62J Admittedely, there is a problem with the availability 
of Soviet policy and doctrinal statements on TNW. The 
mainstream of thought on this matter comes primarily from 
Soviet military journals and publications, which do not 
necessarily reflect official government policy.
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A survey of Soviet literature substantiates 
Colonel Graham D. Vernon's observation that "the 
Soviets consider the advent of nuclear weapons as a 
watershed in the history of military development and 
emphasize the war-fighting rather than deterrent value 
of these weapons,"^ As Vernon notes, most articles 
in Soviet military journals assume a nuclear environment 
and give much attention to a doctrine of use.'' Little 
or no consideration is given TNW as an element of 
deterrence•
This is, of course, in contrast to U.S. and NATO 
TNW policy. For example, NATO’s doctrine of TNF use is 
to delay their employment in theatre conflict until the last
58 .-'^Colonel Graham D. Vernon, ’Soviet Options for
War in Europe: Nuclear or Conventional?" Strategic Review 
(Winter 1979)* 60. Some of the literature which can be 
used to examine recent Soviet thought on TNW: The 
Offensive: A Soviet View (Translated and Published under 
the Auspices of the United States Air Force); Selected 
Soviet Military Writings, 1970-1975 (Translated and 
Published under the Auspices of the United States Air 
Force- U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). Also, see 
fn #5^ below for specific Soviet books and articles on TNW.
54J See specifically I.G. Zav’ yalov, "The New 
Weapon and Military Art," in Selected Soviet Military 
Writings, 1970-1975 (cited above); A.A. Grechko. On 
Guard Over Peace and the Building of Communism (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1971); N.A. Lomov, Scientific Technical Progress 
and the Revolution in Military"Affairs.(Moscow: Voenizdat,
1973); V- Ye Savkin, Basic Principles of Operational Art 
and Tactics (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972); Marshal A.A. Grechko, 
Armed Forces of the Soviet States (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975).
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possible moment. Rather than accept defeat, NATO 
will employ nuclear weapons. But their primary value 
is seen as a deterrent to the outbreak of hostilities.
The basic strategy in case of Soviet aggression in 
central Europe is to withstand the offensive thrust 
as long as possible utilizing conventional capability.
The allies possess sufficient reserve and supply power 
to stem the tide of battle in the long-run, but if NATO 
forces are not able to prolong the conflict without 
suffering a ready and quick defeat by the Soviet blitzkrieg 
capability, then they will resort to TNF use on a 
selective scale, primarily to threaten escaltion, thereby
hoping to deter further aggression. Also, this 
delayed first use puts the responsibility of escalation 
squarely on the Soviet Union. If the logic of deterrence 
is sound, a conflict between East and West in this 
scenario would stabilize due to risk of escalation.
Current American TNW doctrine, however, pre­
supposes that the Soviets measure nuclear exchange by 
the same indices as do the Americans; that is, through 
a calculus of deterrence. As noted above, Soviet military 
literature indicates that this is not the case. At 
the First Nuclear War Conference held in Washington 
during the spring of 1979* Admiral J.T. Hayv/ard charged 
that American strategists "have long labored under the 
;persistent illusion that tactical nuclear weapons 
would not be employed by the U.S.S.R. because of the 
fear of a nuclear exchange. This is not a valid assumption 
They will be employed where and when the Soviets determine 
it will be in their interest. The seemingly 
obvious statement to make at this point is that the 
use of nuclear weapons is not in the interest of the 
Soviet Union due to possible escalation; that re­
gardless of the potential benefits of aggression, their 
use can never outweigh the potential costs involved.
^J. T. Hayward, "How a Nuclear War Would Be Fought, 
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May 1979)* 26.
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This line of deterrent reasoning is the sig­
nificant fallacy of U.S. TNW doctrine. Measurements of 
possible conflict and TNF exchange between the U.S. 
and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies 
continue to take place within the context of deterrence. 
Certainly it can be argued that the myriad of risks 
that an aggressor would run in precipitating war would, 
in all probability, deter precipitation. But such 
assessments are sterile, excluding the real world of 
conflict possibilities. War is not always the product 
of nation A consciously and deliberately initiating 
conflict with nation B. Often, conflict can be cumulative, 
a product of unforeseen events; it can be spontaneous, 
an overreaction to a completely fortuitous incident. 
Whatever the cause, once conflict becomes a reality, 
questions of risks and benefits can no longer be measured 
within the context of a deterrent situation.
For example, in a scenario of European theatre 
war there are several incentives inducing Soviet first 
use of TNW. Given the Blitzkrieg capability of Warsaw 
Pact conventional.forces (structured for a timely and 
successful massive attack, which deemphasizes supply 
and reserve networks), a short war will favor Pact forces 
while a protracted one will work to their disadvantage.
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In conjunction with declaratory doctrine that the 
early employment of TNF will yield decisive military 
advantages, Soviet consideration of the time factor 
seems to imply that nuclear war will be much shorter 
in length than a conventional one and, therefore, 
preferable. In other words, the risks of engaging in 
prolonged conventional warfare with NATO are higher 
than risks of escalation in effectively employed Tactical 
Nuclear Warfare.
Another problem for the Soviets in conducting 
a conventional war can be termed geopolitical. As one 
student of Soviet military strategy has put it, "the 
Soviets are well aware that the loyalties of the peoples 
of (Warsaw Pact) countries are thin, and that a pro­
longed war could create serious problems, particularly
given the the location of these countries astride the
6^logistic lines of Soviet forces."3 Past revolts in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia serve as constant reminders 
to the Soviets of their occupation status. And, of course, 
there is the threat that a prolonged Soviet involvement 
in theatre war will increase the probability of the 
Chinese exploiting the situation for irredentist reasons.
^G.D. Vernon, "Soviet Options for War in Europe," 
Strategic Review, p.-62.
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A two-theatre war is not a situation that the Soviet 
Union, or any other country, desires. There is also 
the consideration of NATO theatre nuclear deployment 
should NATO he on the losing end of a military engagement. 
Why give the NATO forces the opportunity to employ TNF 
first, thereby possibly surrendering an important 
military advantage? Why allow NATO the critical decision 
of how much TNF to employ and where it is to be targeted, 
hoping that the strike is not a pre-emptive one and that 
there will be sufficient Soviet TNF remaining to effect 
a counterstrike?
This scenario serves to illustrate how calculations 
of risks and benefits may change according to the sit­
uational context. In a theatre scenario of non-conflict, 
tactical nuclear forces indeed serve to deter the 
precipitation of conflict; the deterrent value is high.
But in a conflict scenario, at least for the Soviet Union, 
the value of TNF assumes military dimensions which 
supersede those of deterrence. Soviet TNW doctrine -V! 
is one of use in this context, and the recognition of 
TNF deterrent value drops. The shift in calculation is to 
how the enemy's nuclear force will be employed, and this 
calculation will determine what steps toward an actual 
engagement in theatre warfare will be taken.
V I I
If the above analysis of U.S. TNW doctrine is 
correct, then American strategists and policy makers 
have failed to make a crucial distinction in their 
assessment of tactical nuclear force. It has been 
concluded that while the United States possesses a 
substantial tactical nuclear inventory, it lacks a 
doctrine of military use. That is, there has been no 
substantive effort on the part of the U.S. defense 
establishment to incorporate TNF use into military 
doctrine as a weapon to be used in armed engagement­
like any other weapon of war. And, it was noted, this is 
because nuclear weapons thinking has evolved solely 
within the framework of deterrent strategy. ' TNFs have 
been accorded a value only in so far as they figure in 
calculations of deterrence.
<7
-"Carl H. Builder, an analyst with the RAND Corporation, 
makes much the same point in suggesting that "the cumulative 
effects of the Assured Destruction ethic upon our strategic 
thinking" is that "counterforce capabilities are to be 
eschewed. . . as being the fuel of an arms race and the 
hairtriggers of instability." "Why not First-Strike 
Counterforce Capabilities?" Strategic Review (Spring 1979)i 
3^. The "A.ssured Destruction ethic" has also had a pro­
found impact upon the increasing counterforce capability 
(and doctrinal development) of TNW as well.
It was further suggested that the role of TNF 
as being of a deterrent value is counterproductive, 
because the non-recognition of TNF numerical capability 
as a part of a military doctrine of use is, in actuality, 
a negation of the capability itself. In enemy calculations 
of NATO weaponry employment, TNF is not a factor (until 
the most exacting circumstances materialize) to be 
considered in offensive arrangements. The negation of 
TNF capability by the failure to integrate it into a 
doctrine ,of use has led to a serious imbalance of forces 
in theatre situations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which, 
by all indications, accepts tactical nuclear weapons not 
only as having deterrent value, but war-winning value 
as well.
As current data on TNF stockpiles indicate (refer 
above to figure D) the United States enjoys a 
quantitative advantage over the U.S.S.R. But this study 
suggests that U.S. TNF capability is more symbolic than 
real and, thus, is inferior to the TNF capability of the 
Soviet Union, which emphasizes military use. This seems to 
imply two distinct types of capability, which will be 
designated as "Potential Capability" and "Real Capability." 
Potential Capability can be defined as quantitative supplies
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of weaponry which have the potential of being employed.
The potential TNF capability of the United States can 
be measured as 7000+ tactical nuclear warheadsj that of 
the Soviet Union as 4000+. Real Capability, in essence, 
is defined by the doctrine of weaponry employment adhered 
to by a nation's strategists. I have made the case that 
there is at present an imbalance between U.S. and Soviet 
TNF Real Capability, due primarily to the lack of a 
comparable U.S. military doctrine of battlefield use 
with that of the Soviet Union.
The current imbalance of TNF Real Capability portends 
several challenges for American strategists. In con­
siderations of deterrence, the failure to give adequate 
attention to the development of Real Capability has led, 
and continues to lead, to a deterioration of TNF deterrent 
value. While it may be true that in non-conflict 
scenarios (e.g., present NATO/Warsaw Pact status in the 
European theatre) Potential Capability serves as a suffi­
cient deterrent against the direct precipitation of 
conflict by either power, should conflict emerge the 
value of Real Capability becomes increasingly significant 
in estimations of force employment. That is, how the
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Soviets employ their forces and exactly what forces 
are employed may depend upon estimations of American 
Real Capability, particularly with regard to tactical 
nuclear forces. The Soviet Union will in all probability 
employ tactical nuclear weapons in a theatre conflict 
simply because they are effective weapons of war, and 
their first-use guarantees an overwhelming military 
advantage on the field. And this use can only be further 
encouraged if Soviet estimates of NATO resistance do 
not include a serious belief that NATO TNFs will be 
used initially in the conflict. From a purely military 
perspective, the temptation to use a decisive offensive 
weapon while the opponent acquiesces seems overwhelming. 
Equally important is the point, earlier made, that the 
Soviets can hardly afford not to employ TNF given their 
geopolitical problems. A scenario of conventional conflict 
between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces will serve to 
illustrate the importance of a United States TNF Real 
Capability.
Recalling that a theatre war of great duration 
would result in a negative cost/benefit analysis by 
Soviet strategists, an inverse relationshio can be 
established between time and success in a conventional 
war for Soviet and American forces (see Figure E)»
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FIGURE E
II III
time
  = soviet conventional force effectiveness
 --  = american conventional force effectiveness
In the early stages of a war (I), the Soviets 
will possess a substantial quantitative force advantage. 
Victory, however, is not guaranteed by such an advantage.
A combination of factors quite outside measurements of 
conventional capability could produce a stalemate and force 
the Soviets into stage (II) where the effectiveness of 
their conventional force decreases. Certainly it is folly 
to think that the Soviets will continue conventional 
engagement into stage (III). The brief time spent in 
stage (II) will constitute a crucial decision making 
moment for Soviet strategists, particularly with regard 
to TNF employment. It is not an exaggeration to say that
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a comparable- U.S. TNF Real Capability will cause 
carefully measured deliberation among the Soviets in 
deciding whether or not it is in their interest to 
employ TNF, and may be the difference between compromise 
ar stage (II), or escalation onto another plane of 
confrontation- nuclear exchange.
If there is an imperative expressed in this 
essay, it must be found in the necessity for U.S. 
strategists to recognize the dual nature of American 
TNF capability. An examination of TNW doctrine from 
Eisenhower to Carter has shown that no such recognition 
exists. The employment of tactical nuclear force has 
been consistently viewed as a supplement to U.S. deterrent 
strategy, theoretically providing increased flexibility 
in crisis policy options, thus serving as a more 
credible deterrent to aggression. Long ignored has been 
the distinction between deterrence and military strategy, 
and the fact that tactical nuclear weapons must be 
valued within both contexts.
United States tactical nuclear doctrine up to 
this time, however, has been captive to the concept of 
deference. Various criticisms of TNF use explored 
earlier on in this essay have precluded serious consideration
of TNW within the context of military strategy. Thus* 
the paradox of U.S. tactical nuclear weaponry as 
potentially capable but in actuality impotent, lacking 
Real Capability, Conversely, Soviet literature and 
military exercise reveal a substantial level of Real 
Capability in military doctrine. Without integrating 
tactical nuclear forces into American military doctrine, 
the difference in Real Capability between the United 
States and its chief adversary will continue to persist, 
perhpas inviting the very consequences that they are 
meant to deter.
Real Capability of TNF first-use v/ould provide 
the United States, and NATO, with two things. First, 
if Soviet estimations of U.S./NATO response to theatre 
conflict include the immediate use of tactical nuclear 
weapons, then the risks of any incursion or conflict 
are compounded. The compounding of risks would supplement 
the deterrent value of NATO’s TNF in both non-conflict 
and conflict scenarios. Second, and more importantly, 
should conflict emerge, the NATO forces could utilze 
nuclear weapons for military advantage. As much as 
strategists consider the risks of escalation in the use 
of TNF, it cannot cannot be denied that nuclear weapons 
are part and parcel of both Soviet and U.S. arsenals.
And, they can be decisive in a military conflict.
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Speculating on the employment of tactical nuclear 
weapons in a Soviet-American theatre war is not an 
enviable task on the part of strategists and policy 
makers. But these weapons do exist and, as it has been 
suggested, must be integrated into military tactics and 
strategy for what they are—  contemporary weapons of 
war. It must be assumed that, as weapons of war, they 
will be used in an East-West theatre conflict where 
the stakes are high, such as in Europe. And consequently, 
in assessments of the military advantages to be gained 
by nuclear weapons use, it is in the interest of the 
United States and its allies to acquire a TNF first- 
.use capability.
Recalling earlier criticisms of Tactical Nuclear 
Warfare, however, one is forced to challenge the state­
ment that TNF use can be in the interest of any nation. 
The problem of distinguishing between tactical nuclear 
weapons use and strategic nuclear weapons use is not 
insignificant. The failure to make such a distinction 
could, and probably would, lead to an escalation to 
general nuclear exchange. Since this essay recommends 
a military doctrine of TNF first-use in American-Soviet 
theatre conflict, it must, then, deal with this, and 
other, criticisms of Tactical Nuclear Warfare.
In the Strategy of Conflict, Thomas C. Schilling
adequately outlines the basic problem of distinguishing
between tactical nuclear weapons and their strategic
counterparts. The problem is not seen so much as creating
a distinction than as eroding one. To elaborate,
Schelling sees the major distinction in weaponry not
as strategic and tactical, but as nuclear and non-nuclear.
He makes the point that
A distinction exists between nuclear and other 
weapons even though the distinction is not 
physical but is psychic, perceptual, legalistic, 
or symbolic. That small-yield nuclears delivered 
with ’pinpoint’ accuracy are just a form of 
artillery, and consequently do not prejudice 
the issue of limits in war, is an argument based 
exclusively on an anlysis of weapons■effects.58
According to Schelling, nuclear weapons have not
been used tactically (or strategically since Hiroshima
and Nagasaki) because there is a tradition for their
non-use. Limited war depends upon the participants
recognizing the validity of several types of constraint,
for example, a border or an international law. "The
fundamental characteristic of any limit in a limited
war is the psychic, intellectual, or social characteristic
CQ
of being mutually recognized by both sides. . . . And the
-^Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 
(Londons Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 257*
^Ibid., p. 260.
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non-use of TNF is a mutually recognized tacit bargain.
Schelling concludes by stating that the key to using
TNFs successfully within a theatre context is to be
found in eroding the distinction between a tactical
nuclear weapon and other conventional artillery. Once
there is a new tacit bargain between the superpowers
as to the role of TNFs in theatre conflicts, then such
conflicts need not have the high probability of escalation
to general nuclear exchange usually associated with
TNF use. "It is difficult to imagine that the tacit
agreement that nuclear weapons are different would be
as powerfully present on the occasion of the next limited
6 owar after they had already been used in one."
To speak of eroding the distinction betwen TNFs 
and contemporary conventional weaponry is one thing. 
However, to erode the distinction is another. This essay 
referred earlier to the most significant problem in­
volved in using a tactical nuclear weapon: How would 
an opponent know that the nuclear weapon is being used 
in a tactical and not in a strategic manner? How could 
the Soviet Union be assured that the use of low-yield 
nuclear weapons by NATO was not the first stage of a 
massive pre-emptive strike? Indeed, would the size of
Ibid.. pp. 264-65.
the warhead be an issue? How about range, throw-weight, 
and even the source of firing? Would tactical nuclear 
weapons have to be launched * from Foward Based Systems 
(contiguous to destination), ot could they be launched 
from the sea, via submarine or cruiser? Schelling would 
assert that there must be a "tacit agreement” or "bargain 
on all of these problems. I suggest that there already is 
The dichotomous classification of Potential Capability 
and Real Capability is again useful.
In so far as Potential Capability (numbers and 
types of.nuclear weapons) is concerned, the difference 
between a strategic nuclear weapon and a tactical nuclear 
weapon is clear enough. Research and Development on 
these weapons make the distinction from the outset. Range 
is one factor. Strategic weapons are those regarded as 
intercontinental (intercontinental being defined as the 
distance from the Soviet Union to the United States 
for a ballistic missile to travel, and vice versa). The 
range and land-based location of these missiles are 
usually fixed and classified accordingly. For example, 
it would be difficult for the Soviets to deploy a missile 
with a range of 5000 miles on the East European border 
and declare it a tactical nuclear weapon. Likewise, the
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United States would be hard put to justify the
deployment of the forthcoming MX missile in Western
Europe as a part of NATO's TNF. Thus, strategic weapons
are developed with an intercontinental mission in mind.
Their range, and usually their payload, are indicators 
61of this. On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons
are specifically tailored for theatre conflict. The
range of a tactical nuclear missile is seldom above
800-1000 miles. The payload varies, but does not seem
r- to reach the magaton level. Perhaps the greatest source
of definition is, however, Research and Development.
* - Both countries develop a nuclear weapons system with a
6 ?mission, a purpose in store for that system.
61Due to less accuracy m  targeting, Soviet 
^missiles carry a greater payload of explosive power.
Most Soviet strategic missiles carry warheads with 
10-25 megatons (millions of tons equivalent TNT) of 
power as contrasted with U.S. strategic missiles at 
about 150-300 kiiotons (thousands of tons equivalent 
TNT) of power. Tactical weapons vary accordingly.
62There are a few weapons with dual capability 
in the sense that they can serve both strategic and 
tactical missions. The American cruise missile and 
the Soviet Backfire bomber are good examples of this. 
Both have ranges that can be extended with modification. 
The Soviet Union and the United States, however, 
attempt to minimize the difficulties involved in the 
development of dual capable nuclear weapons by declaring 
intent as to their potential and actual use. SALT is 
a great stabilizer here. For example, SALT II limits 
the range of cruise missiles (U.S.) launched from 
land and air based systems, while curtailing production 
of the Backfire bobmber and imposing a condition of 
restraint in deploying the weapon strategically.
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Real Capability has been defined as the doctrinal 
capability to employ nuclear weapons. It is a measure 
of basically what percentage of weapons can be employed 
(Potential Capability) will be employed in a given 
military conflict situation. Real Capability, or the 
doctrine of nuclear weapons use, has been a point of 
ambiguity in calculations of possible escalation in 
a theatre nuclear conflict. Consequently, many of the 
criticisms of Tactical Nuclear Warfare have been directed 
against Real Capability. If the United States employs 
TNF in a.theatre conflict, how can the Soviet Union 
be assured that the Real Capability utilized is tactical 
and not strategic? That is, can either the Soviet Union 
or the United States distinguish between TNF use as a 
,theatre military tactic and TNF use as the first stage 
of a pre-emptive strategic first-strike? The failure to 
make such a distinction would more than likely result 
in the much feared escalation to general nuclear exchange.
While many critics have argued against TNF use 
because of the ambiguities involved in forming distinctions 
between tactical and strategic nuclear force Real 
Capability, there seem to be several mitigating factors 
which encourage a quite different conclusion as to how 
accurately an opponent can perceive the intent behind
nuclear weapons use. For one thing, TNF doctrines of 
use are becoming more refined, along with the weapons 
themselves which can be employed effectively to 
accomplish the most limited of missions. The state 
of advanced technology in the construction of tactical 
nuclear weapons guarantees a very specific use, 
commensurate with the demands of a local theatre war.
Perhaps the greatest impetus to the growing 
distinction between Real Capability in strategic and 
in tactical nuclear weapons has been the deployment of 
TNFs in the European theatre for such a long time.
,’The very presence of TNFs in Europe has guaranteed 
and clarified their role as tactical weapons of war.
The United States is well aware that the Soviets have 
deployed a great number of tactical nuclear weapons 
within Warsaw Pact countries and are training their 
forces for combat in a nuclear environment. There 
would be little surprise in U.S. and NATO policy making 
circles if the Soviet Union employed TNFs in theatre war. 
And, given current NATO TNF Real Capability, there would 
likewise be little surprise if NATO employed TNFs in 
a theatre war that they were losing. Thus, the very 
presence of tactical nuclear weapons and the attention 
recently paid to military doctrines of use by both
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NATO and Warsaw Pact forces have (1) eroded the 
distinction between tactical nuclear weapons and con­
ventional weaponry and, consequently, (2) emphasized 
the disparate nature of tactical and strategic nuclear 
weapons relative to one another.
This study does not attempt, however, to minimize 
the risks involved in nuclear weapons use. They have 
never been used before by two powers in war against 
each other and there are necessarily a great number of 
"ifs.". But this study has sought to introduce Tactical 
Nuclear Warfare as a viable strategy for the United 
States in theatre conflict with Soviet forces. It accepts 
nuclear weapons as weapons of war, appraises their 
military advantages and disadvantages, outlines the 
development of both American and Soviet TNF doctrines of 
use, and concludes by suggesting that the United States 
would assume an inferior role in a theatre conflict 
with Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces due to the lack of a 
comparable TNF doctrine of use.
It is fair to say that by incorporating a first- 
use strategy into U.S./NATO nuclear military posture, 
the costs of conflict are heightened? that a first-use 
strategy does not even allow for the possibility of a 
conventional exchange. But given the present state of
Soviet TNF military doctrine for theatre conflict, 
allowing for conventional war in a nuclear era may 
itself result in unacceptable costs and escalation 
to a more general stage of conflict.
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